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Abstract. Disjunction Category Labels (DC-labels) are an expressive
label format used to classify the sensitivity of data in information-flow
control systems. DC-labels use capability-like privileges to downgrade in-
formation. Inappropriate use of privileges can compromise security, but
DC-labels provide no mechanism to ensure appropriate use. We extend
DC-labels with the novel notions of bounded privileges and robust priv-
ileges. Bounded privileges specify and enforce upper and lower bounds
on the labels of data that may be downgraded. Bounded privileges are
simple and intuitive, yet can express a rich set of desirable security poli-
cies. Robust privileges can be used only in downgrading operations that
are robust, i.e., the code exercising privileges cannot be abused to release
or certify more information than intended. Surprisingly, robust down-
grades can be expressed in DC-labels as downgrading operations using
a weakened privilege. We provide sound and complete run-time security
checks to ensure downgrading operations are robust. We illustrate the
applicability of bounded and robust privileges in a case study as well as
by identifying a vulnerability in an existing DC-label-based application.
1 Introduction
Information-flow control (IFC) systems track the flow of information by associ-
ating labels with data. Disjunction Category Labels (DC-labels) are a practical
and expressive label format that can capture the security concerns of principals.
IFC systems and DC-labels can provide strong, expressive, and practical infor-
mation security guarantees, preventing exploitation of, for example, cross-site
scripting and code injection vulnerabilities [9, 10,19,23,26].
IFC systems often need to downgrade information: declassification down-
grades confidentiality, and endorsement downgrades integrity. Downgrading of
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DC-labels occurs via operations that require unforgeable capability-like tokens
known as privileges. Unfortunately, DC-labels oﬀer no methodology to protect
developers from the discretionary (i.e., unrestricted) exercise of privileges—even
a minor mistake in handling privileges can compromise the whole system’s se-
curity. For example, we found a one-line vulnerability in an existing DC-label
application written by experts that enabled confidential information to be inap-
propriately released, thus violating the application’s intended security properties.
To address this, we introduce restricted privileges: privileges that are limited
in their ability to declassify and endorse information. By declaratively restricting
the use of privileges, developers can reason about the security properties of the
system, regardless of the code that may possess or use the restricted privileges.
Thus, the developer’s local declaration of restrictions enables the enforcement of
global information security guarantees.
We present two kinds of restricted privileges: bounded privileges and robust
privileges. A bounded privilege imposes upper and lower bounds on the DC-labels
of data that is declassified or endorsed using that privilege. Robust privileges
avoid the accidental or malicious use of privileges to declassify or endorse more
information than intended, achieving a property known as robustness [16, 25].
Bounded Privileges. A bounded privilege wraps an unrestricted privilege with
two immutable labels that indicate upper and lower bounds for downgrading.
DC-labels form a lattice structure (described in Section 2), and thus a bounded
privilege restricts where in the lattice downgrading may occur. A bounded priv-
ilege also has a mode, indicating whether the bounded privilege may be used for
declassification, endorsement, or both declassification and endorsement.
In terms of confidentiality, the upper bound limits the confidentiality of in-
formation that can be declassified using the privilege, and the lower bound limits
the confidentiality of the information after declassification. For example, suppose
principal fb.com passes a bounded privilege to gogl.com. If the lower bound of
the bounded privilege is the label “gogl.com” then the privilege can be used to
declassify information only from fb.com to gogl.com. Even if gogl.com passes
the bounded privilege to another domain, say evil.com, the bounded privilege
cannot be used to declassify information from fb.com to evil.com.
In terms of integrity, the upper bound of a bounded privilege indicates the
least trustworthy level of information the privilege can be used to endorse, and
the lower bound limits the integrity of the information after endorsement. For
example, by setting the upper bound appropriately, fb.com can create a bounded
privilege that can be used to endorse data only from gogl.com, and cannot be
used to endorse other data, say from evil.com.
Robust Privileges. The security of a system might be at risk if an attacker
is able to influence the decision to declassify or endorse information, or can
influence what information is declassified. For example, consider a routine that
receives a secret pair (username,password) and uses a privilege to declassify the
first component of the pair. If an attacker (from another system component) can
influence the pair to be (password,username) and trigger the declassification,
the password will be leaked.
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Robust declassification [25] and qualified robustness [16] are end-to-end se-
mantic security guarantees that ensure that attackers are unable to inappropri-
ately influence what information is revealed to them. These security conditions
can be enforced by restricting declassification and endorsement operations. A ro-
bust privilege wraps a privilege and ensures that it is used only in declassification
and endorsement operations that satisfy appropriate robustness checks.
This paper makes the following contributions: (i) We introduce bounded
and robust privileges to limit the exercise of privileges for declassification and
endorsement. (ii) We present a semantic characterization of how bounded privi-
leges and robust privileges restrict declassification and endorsement operations.
(iii) We define run-time security checks for bounded privileges and robust priv-
ileges that soundly and completely enforce the semantic characterization of re-
stricted downgrading operations. The run-time checking for robust downgrading
is eﬀectively a weakening of the underlying unrestricted privilege: a surpris-
ingly simple characterization of robustness. (iv) We illustrate the applicability
of bounded and robust privileges via a case study. Moreover, use of restricted
privileges identified a vulnerability in an existing DC-label-based application.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the DC-label model.
Section 3 characterizes downgrading operations that use restricted privileges, and
Section 4 provides the corresponding enforcement. Section 5 describes security
properties in the presence of multiple restricted privileges. Case studies are given
in Section 6. Section 7 examines related work and Section 8 concludes.
2 Background
We briefly define three concepts fundamental to our presentation: the DC-label
model, privileges, and floating label systems.
C1 vc C2 () C2 ) C1
C1 tc C2 () C1 ^ C2
C1 uc C2 () C1 _ C2
?c ⌘ True >c ⌘ False
Fig. 1: Confidentiality Lattice
I1 vi I2 () I1 ) I2
I1 ti I2 () I1 _ I2
I1 ui I2 () I1 ^ I2
?i ⌘ False >i ⌘ True
Fig. 2: Integrity Lattice
Label Lattice DC-labels [21] are pairs of
confidentiality and integrity policies. Con-
fidentiality polices describe who may learn
information. Integrity polices describe who
takes responsibility or vouches for informa-
tion. Both confidentiality and integrity poli-
cies are positive propositional formulas in
conjunctive normal form, where propositional
constants represent principals. Let CNF de-
note the set of all positive propositional for-
mulas in conjunctive normal form; we use the
term formula to range over CNF. We assume
that operations on formulas always reduce
their results to conjunctive normal form.
Both confidentiality policies and integrity
policies form lattices—see Figures 1 and 2.
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We interpret C1 vc C2 as: C2 is at least as confidential as C1. For instance,
Alice _ Bob vc Alice, which means that data readable by either Alice or Bob
is less confidential than data readable only by Alice. Conjunctions of princi-
pals represent the multiple interest of principals to protect the data. Conversely,
disjunctions of principals represent groups wherein any member may learn the
information. The integrity lattice is dually defined [3]; we interpret I1 vi I2 as:
I1 is at least as trustworthy as I2. For example, Alice^Bob vi Alice, which indi-
cates that data vouched for by Alice^Bob is more trustworthy than data vouched
for only by Alice. In this case, conjunctions of principals represent groups whose
members are independently responsible for the information. For example, data
with integrity Alice^Bob means that Alice is completely responsible for the data,
and so is Bob. Conversely, disjunctions of principals represent groups that col-
lectively take responsibility for the information, however, no principal takes sole
responsibility. For example, data with integrity Alice_Bob means that Alice and
Bob collectively are responsible for the data, i.e., both may have contributed to,
or influenced the computation of the data.
hC1, I1i v hC2, I2i () C1 vc C2 and I1 vi I2
hC1, I1i t hC2, I2i ⌘ hC1 tc C2, I1 ti I2i
hC1, I1i u hC2, I2i ⌘ hC1 uc C2, I1 ui I2i
c(hC, Ii) ⌘ C i(hC, Ii) ⌘ I
Fig. 3: Security lattice for DC-labels
Formally, a DC-label is a
pair of a confidentiality pol-
icy C and an integrity policy
I, written hC, Ii. DC-labels
form a product lattice given
in Figure 3. The v relation is
called the can-flow-to relation
because it describes informa-
tion flows that respect confidentiality and integrity policies. We write c(·) and
i(·) for the projection of confidentiality and integrity components, respectively.
hAlice,Charliei 6v hAlice,Charlie ^ Alicei
Fig. 4: Downgrading integrity
hAlice ^ Bob,Charliei 6v hBob,Charliei
Fig. 5: Downgrading confidentiality
Downgrading In the DC-label
model, one security policy downgrades
to another security policy if they do
not satisfy the can-flow-to relation.
Consider the pair of security labels in
Figure 4. The first security label en-
forces the policy that data is vouched
for by Charlie. The second security la-
bel enforces the policy that data is vouched for by Charlie and Alice, therefore a
secure system cannot permit data to flow from the sources protected by the first
policy to sinks protected by the second policy. This downgrade is an endorse-
ment, since it downgrades only integrity, i.e., it makes a value more trustworthy.
Dually, a declassification downgrades only confidentiality, i.e., it makes a value
less confidential. Consider the pair of security labels in Figure 5: The first secu-
rity label enforces the policy that data is confidential to Alice^Bob. The second
security label enforces that data is confidential to Bob. Permitting data to flow
from a source protected by the first policy to a sink protected by the second
policy violates the confidentiality expectations of the source.
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hC1, I1i vp hC2, I2i () C1 vcp C2 and I1 vip I2
where C1 vcp C2 () C1 vc C2 tc p
I1 vip I2 () I1 ui p vi I2
Fig. 6: Relation can-flow-to-with-privilege-p
Privileges Practical systems must permit some downgrading. The DC-label
model controls downgrading with privileges, where every principal has an as-
sociated privilege, and a principal’s privilege enables downgrading. More pre-
cisely, given principal p, the can-flow-to-with-privilege-p relationship, written
vp, describes the information flows permitted with p’s privilege—see Figure
6. Observe that both downgrading examples from the previous section are now
permitted by the can-flow-to-with-privilege relationship for the principal Alice,
i.e., hAlice,Charliei vAlice hAlice,Charlie ^ Alicei and hAlice ^ Bob,Charliei vAlice
hBob,Charliei.
Floating label systems DC-labels are usually part of floating label systems
like LIO [22], Hails [9], and COWL [23]. Such systems associate a current la-
bel, Lpc , with every computational task—this label plays a role similar to the
program counter (PC) in more traditional language-based IFC approaches [19].
The current label denotes the fact that a computation depends only on data
with labels bounded above by Lpc . When a task with current label Lpc observes
information with label LA, the current label after observation, L0pc , must “float”
above both the previous current label and the observed information’s label, i.e.,
L0pc = Lpc t LA. Importantly, and to respect the security lattice, the current
label restricts the subsequent writes to communication channels. Specifically, a
task with current label Lpc is prevented from writing to channels protected by
policy LA if Lpc 6v LA.
Floating-label systems typically use some run-time representation of princi-
pals’ privilege, and downgrading operations require the run-time representation
of a principal p’s privilege to be presented in order to use the can-flow-to-with-
privilege-p relation, vp. Thus, the run-time representation of a principal’s priv-
ilege acts like a capability to downgrade that principal’s information. We write
pQ for the run-time representation of the privilege of principal p, and refer to
this value as a raw privilege (to contrast it with the restricted privileges that we
introduce in this paper).
3 Security Definitions
If a system contains pQ, then downgrading of data with policies involving p
depends entirely on how pQ is used in the system. Reasoning about what down-
grading occurs may require reasoning about global properties of the system.
Indeed, we found a vulnerability in a Hails example application [9] of a web-
based rock-paper-scissors game where use of a raw privilege was localized to one
component, but arbitrary data could be passed to this component to be down-
graded. This motivates our work to restrict privileges, and enable local reasoning
about downgrading that may occur in a system.
5
A restricted privilege is a raw privilege “wrapped” with limitations on its use.
These limitations enable sound reasoning about the downgrading that may be
performed using the restricted privilege, even if arbitrary code uses the restricted
privilege. Thus, local reasoning that ensures pQ is always appropriately restricted
provides global guarantees about the downgrading that can occur with respect
to policies involving p.
We present two kinds of restricted privileges, bounded privileges and robust
privileges, which provide simple declarative limitations on the use of raw privi-
leges.
Bounded Privileges A bounded privilege wraps a raw privilege with down-
grading bounds and a downgrading mode. A downgrading bound is a pair of
security lattice labels Lhigh and Llow that provide upper and lower bounds on
downgrading, and the mode indicates whether the bounded privilege can be used
to both declassify and endorse, only to declassify, or only to endorse.
Definition 1 (Downgrading bounds). An operation that downgrades from
security policy Lfrom to security policy Lto in a computational context with
current label Lpc satisfies downgrading bounds Lhigh and Llow if and only if
(Lfrom t Lpc) v Lhigh and Llow v (Lto t Lpc)
Definition 2 (Bounded privileges). A bounded privilege with bounds Lhigh
and Llow and mode m on privilege pQ, written m[pQ]
Lhigh
Llow
, can be used only for
downgrading operations with privilege pQ that satisfy downgrading bounds Lhigh
and Llow . Mode m is one of de, d, or e. Declassification operations are permitted
only if the mode is de or d; endorsement operations are permitted only if the mode
is de or e.
⊥	= ⟨True, False⟩
⊤	= ⟨False, True⟩
Lhigh
Llow
integrity
co
nfi
de
nti
ali
ty
⟨A v B, A∧B⟩
⟨A∧B, A v B⟩
⟨A v B, A v B⟩
information
flow
(⊑)
⟨A∧B, A∧B⟩
Fig. 7: Bounded Downgrading
Figure 7 shows a visualiza-
tion of bounded downgrading.
The security lattice on the left
is overlaid with a visualiza-
tion of where bounded down-
grading can occur (shaded)
with respect to bounds Lhigh
and Llow . The security lattice
on the right shows an exam-
ple of what labeled values can
be declassified (shaded) with a bounded declassification privilege with bounds
Lhigh = hA ^ B,A _ Bi and Llow = hA _ B,A ^ Bi.
In essence, the confidentiality lattice has collapsed c(Lhigh) and c(Llow ) and
all points in between: information that has confidentiality up to c(Lhigh) may
be declassified to confidentiality c(Llow )—all other points in the confidentiality
lattice are not aﬀected. Guarantees for endorsement with respect to bounded
privileges are similar, but for integrity instead of confidentiality.
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Example 1 (Policy: Only Bob controls Alice’s privilege). Principal Alice allows
Bob to declassify her data provided that Bob vouches for the data and the
decision to declassify. In other words, information labeled with Alice can be
declassified only after endorsement by Bob. This property can be captured by a
bounded privilege with mode d and bounds: Lhigh = h>c,Bobi, Llow = h?c,Bobi.
If the privilege is used to declassify information that is not endorsed by Bob or in
a context where the current label is not endorsed by Bob, then the declassification
fails. In general, data must be vouched for by Bob (e.g., by using BobQ or
another restricted privilege) before the bounded privilege for Alice can be used.
For example, if a computational task has a current label Lpc = hAlice,Bob _
Charliei, the current label must be endorsed by Bob first. By endorsing the
current label, Bob eﬀectively vouches for any influence Charlie may have had
on the computational task.
Example 2 (Policy: “A close source said...”). The bounded privilege d[AliceQ]h>
c,>ii
h?c,>ii
requires that the integrity of data being declassified is >i, i.e., data that no
principal takes responsibility for. Alice may wish to impose this restriction on
declassification involving data confidential to her to ensure that she has plausible
deniability regarding the source of the data released. That is, the bounded priv-
ilege can not be used to declassify data for which Alice is explicitly responsible.
Robust Privileges Robustness [16, 25] is a semantic security condition that
limits downgrading based on which principals might benefit from the downgrad-
ing, and which principals have influenced the data to downgrade and the decision
to downgrade.
Consider a declassification of information from a source protected by label
Lfrom to a sink protected by label Lto . A formula A (representing a principal
or party of principals) will benefit from the declassification if A cannot read
from the source, but can read the sink, i.e., c(Lfrom) 6vc A and c(Lto) vc A.
A robust declassification does not permit any principal that benefits from it to
influence either the decision to declassify or the data to declassify. A influences
the decision to declassify if A vi i(Lpc), and A influences the data to declassify
if A vi i(Lfrom).
Definition 3 (Robust declassification). A robust declassification using priv-
ilege pQ from a source protected by Lfrom to a sink protected by Lto, in a com-
putational context with current label Lpc is a declassification (i.e., c(Lfrom) vcp
c(Lto)) where 8A 2 CNF.c(Lto) vc A ^ c(Lfrom) 6vc A ) A 6vi i(Lpc) ^ A 6vi
i(Lfrom).
For endorsement, a principal benifits if it may be held responsible for infor-
mation from the source but is not held responsible for information from the sink.
In other words, A benefits from an endorsement if A gets absolved of responsi-
bility for a value, i.e., A vi i(Lfrom)^A 6vi i(Lto). Robust endorsement does not
permit principals that benefit from it to influence the decision to endorse.
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Definition 4 (Robust endorsement). A robust endorsement using privilege
pQ from a source protected by Lfrom to a sink protected by Lto, in a computational
context with current label Lpc is an endorsement (i.e., i(Lfrom) vip i(Lto)) where
8A 2 CNF.A vi i(Lfrom) ^A 6vi i(Lto)) A 6vi i(Lpc).
A robust privilege is a privilege that can only be used for robust downgrading
operations.
Definition 5 (Robust privilege). A robust privilege with mode m on priv-
ilege pQ, written rbstm{pQ}, restricts downgrading operations where it is used
to those that are robust for pQ. Mode m is one of de, d, or e. Declassification
operations are permitted only if the mode is de or d; endorsement operations are
permitted only if the mode is de or e.
The definitions of robust declassification and endorsements both quantify
over all formulas A in the (possibly infinite) set CNF. In Section 4, we consider
how to implement eﬃcient checks that do not use universal quantification.
C(
L lo
w)
information
flow
(⊑)
Lfrom
Llow
⊤= ⟨False, True⟩
co
nfi
de
nti
ali
tyintegrity
I
⟨A v B, A⟩
⟨A∧B, A⟩
⊥=⟨True, False⟩
AA
Fig. 8: Robust Declassification
Figure 8 shows a visual-
ization of where robust de-
classification is allowed for a
given robust privilege. The se-
curity lattice on the left is
overlaid with a visualization
of where a value with la-
bel Lfrom can be declassified
to (shaded line) using a ro-
bust declassification privilege.
(Note that the current label
Lpc is not included in the diagram for brevity.) I represents the boolean formula
for the integrity of the labeled value. Llow is one of the lowest points where Lfrom
can be declassified to while still being a robust declassification, i.e., Llow v Lto .
That is, the integrity of the label of the value for declassification (together with
the integrity of the current label of the process) is used as a lower bound for de-
classification. Intuitively, those who influence a declassification should not learn
from it. In the right hand side of Figure 8, the shaded line indicates to where a
robust privilege may declassify the labeled value hA^B,Ai. The declassification
is robust if A is not able to learn from the declassification. As a result, the value
could not be declassified to hA _ B,Ai as A would learn from a declassification
that it influenced. In contrast, it is robust to declassify it to hB,Ai.
4 Enforcement for robust privileges
In this section we describe enforcement mechanisms for restricted privileges that
satisfy their semantic characterizations described in Section 3. We have imple-
mented these mechanisms in LIO and use them in our case study (see Section 6).
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When a bounded privilege (Definition 2) is used at run time, it is simple to
check that the downgrading operation satisfies the appropriate bounds, since the
labels relevant to the downgrading (Lfrom , Lto , and Lpc) are all available at run
time, and the label ordering relation can be easily checked dynamically.
Robust privileges (Definition 5) impose restrictions on downgrading opera-
tions which quantify over formulas A. However, attempting to explicitly check
each possible formula A at run time is not feasible. We can however, derive simple
and eﬃcient run-time checks that are sound and complete with respect to their
semantic characterizations. These checks are inspired by Chong and Meyers [6],
who provide run-time checks for robustness that are sound but not complete.
The following theorem shows that the semantic characterization of robust
declassification (Definition 3) is equivalent to two confidentiality-policy compar-
isons involving only Lfrom , Lto , and Lpc .
Theorem 1 (Robust declassification check). A declassification using privi-
lege pQ from a source protected by Lfrom to a sink protected by Lto in a computa-
tional context with current label Lpc is robust if and only if c(Lfrom) vcp c(Lto),
c(Lfrom) vc c(Lto) tc i(Lpc), and c(Lfrom) vc c(Lto) tc i(Lfrom).
The run-time check ensures that if there is any formula A that benefits from
the declassification (c(Lfrom) 6vc A and c(Lto) vc A) then A 6vi i(Lpc) (or,
equivalently, i(Lpc) 6vc A), and similarly that A 6vi i(Lfrom). Thus, the run-time
check converts a comparison of integrity policies to a comparison of integrity
policies that does not involve A.
The next theorem describes a simple run-time check for robust endorsement.
Theorem 2 (Robust endorsement check). An endorsement using privilege
pQ from a source protected by Lfrom to a sink protected by Lto in a computational
context with current label Lpc is robust (Definition 4) if and only if i(Lfrom) vip
i(Lto), and i(Lpc) ui i(Lfrom) vi i(Lto).
The run-time check that all formulas A that may be responsible for either the
current label (A vi i(Lpc)) or the data itself (A vi i(Lfrom)) should also be
responsible for the data after endorsement (A vi i(Lto)). Proofs of Theorems 1
and 2 are omitted due to space limitations.
Alternative formulation In DC-labels, privileges can be arbitrary formulas,
which can be stronger or weaker than privileges for individual principals. For
example, a privilege for A^B can downgrade more information than a privilege
for A or B alone, whereas a privilege for A _ B can downgrade less information
than a privilege for A or B alone. Leveraging this feature, we show how robust
downgrading can be seen (and enforced) as normal downgrading operations that
use a weakened privilege. That is, the privilege used in a downgrading operation
is weakened so as to permit all and only robust downgrading operations.
The next corollaries follow from Theorems 1 and 2 and the definition for the
can-flow-to-with-privilege-p relation.
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Corollary 1. A declassification using raw privilege pQ from a source protected
by Lfrom to a sink protected by Lto in a computational context with current label
Lpc is robust (Definition 3) if and only if c(Lfrom) vcp _ i(Lfrom) _ i(Lpc) c(Lto).
This indicates that robust declassification can be achieved by simply weakening
privilege pQ with the integrity labels of the current label and the data to be
released, i.e., p_ i(Lfrom)_ i(Lpc). Robust endorsement has a similar corollary.
Corollary 2. An endorsement using raw privilege pQ from a source protected
by Lfrom to a sink protected by Lto in a computational context with current label
Lpc is robust (Definition 3) if and only if i(Lfrom) vip _ i(Lpc) i(Lto).
The proof of Corollary 1 is omitted due to space limitations; the proof of
Corollary 2 is similar.
The current implementation of DC-labels [21] provides the ability to infer
appropriate Lto labels of downgrading operations given a privilege p. By ex-
pressing the runtime checks for robust downgrading operations as a standard
downgrading operation with a weakened privilege, we can take advantage of this
feature and automatically infer a suitable Lto label if one exists. This reduces
the burden on the programmer.
5 Interaction among restricted privileges
We can extend restricted privileges to allow them to be composed, i.e., by al-
lowing bounded privileges and robust privileges to wrap around other restricted
privileges, as well as raw privileges. The guarantee provided by the composi-
tion of restricted privileges is the intersection of their individual guarantees.
For example, a bounded privilege composed with another bounded privilege will
require that downgrading operations satisfy the bounds of both privileges. A
bounded privilege composed with a robust privilege (and vice-versa) requires
the downgrading both to be robust and satisfy the downgrading bounds. Robust
privileges are idempotent: a robust privilege composed with a robust privilege
will simply require all downgrade operations to be robust.
Lfrom
L'
Lto
Bounded 
Endorsement
Bounded
Declassification
integrity
co
nfi
de
nti
ali
ty
Fig. 9: Multiple bounds.
Privileges might also interact because a
system has multiple privileges available. Un-
like composed privileges (which further re-
strict possible information flows), multiple
privileges enable additional information flows.
In the remainder of the section, we discuss the
guarantees that result from the use of mul-
tiple restricted privileges. In the accompany-
ing figures, bounded privileges are depicted
as a shaded rectangle corresponding to their
bounds. Robust declassification privileges are depicted as a pair of dashed lines:
one line represents the integrity of the source and the other line represents the
lower bound to which data may be declassified. Labels are depicted as points
along with their names.
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Bounded declassification and bounded endorsement Figure 9 depicts two bounded
privileges, one for declassification and one for endorsement, as well as a label,
Lfrom that is outside the bounds of the declassification privilege. Because the
bounds of the privileges overlap, data can transitively flow from Lfrom to Lto .
The endorsement privilege enables data from Lfrom to be endorsed to L0. The
bounded declassification privilege can then declassify data from L0 to Lto .
Clow
I
Bounded
Declassification
Lto
integrity
co
nfi
de
nti
ali
ty
L'
Lfrom
Fig. 10: Bounded and robust de-
classification.
Bounded declassification and robust declassi-
fication Figure 10 depicts two declassifica-
tion privileges, one robust and one bounded,
and a label that is outside the bounds of
the bounded declassification privilege. Neither
privilege alone permits a flow from Lfrom to
Lto . However, when used together, the robust
declassification privilege permits declassifica-
tion of data from Lfrom to L0 and the bounded
declassification permits a flow from L0 to Lto ,
completing a flow from Lfrom to Lto .
Endorsement and robust declassification In a
system with unrestricted endorsement, robust
declassification provides almost no protection against attackers influencing what
they learn. Intuitively, the endorsement of data by p can make the data trust-
worthy enough to make a subsequent declassification robust. Consider a declas-
sification of a value from label Lfrom = hA^B,Ai to L = hA,Ai using the robust
privilege rbstd{BQ}. This declassification is not robust: principal A, who benefits
from this declassification, may be held responsible for the value, i.e., A may have
decided what gets declassified. However, an unrestricted endorsement privilege
BQ could be used to endorse the value—eﬀectively endorsing any possible in-
fluence by A. In other words, hA ^ B,Ai can be endorsed to hA ^ B,Bi, and a
subsequent declassification from hA ^ B,Bi to hA,Bi is robust.
Llow
L1
L2
I1
I2
C 1
C 2
L''
L'
Fig. 11: Bounded endorsement
and robust declassification.
Bounded endorsement eﬀectively limits
the aforementioned deletrious eﬀects of unre-
stricted endorsement to the bounded area of
the lattice, Figure 11 depicts this situation.
Besides mitigating the eﬀects of unrestricted
endorsement, bounded endorsement is useful
to relax robust declassification so that it suc-
ceeds for principals collaborating in achieving
a common goal—see, for example, Section 6.
Bounded and robust declassification Figure 10
shows the guarantees when a robust declassification-only privilege (i.e.,
rbstd{pQ}) and a bounded declassification-only privilege (i.e., d[pQ]LhighLlow ) for the
same principal are both available in the system. Intuitively, p’s information can
be declassified from Lfromto L0 using the robust privilege. The information can
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then be declassified again to Lto using the bounded privilege, even though Lfrom
is below the threshold imposed by robust declassification (i.e., the lowest pos-
sible label that robust declassification could declassify label Lfrom). Thus, the
presence of a bounded declassification-only privilege can bypass the guarantees
provided by robust declassification.
Several bounded privileges Multiple robust privileges for the same principal do
not add any additional complexity, as all robust privileges are equivalent (up
to their modes). Bounded privileges, however, may diﬀer on the bounds they
impose. The presence of multiple bounded privileges in a system for princi-
pal p collapses the label lattice for principal p in complex ways. For instance,
the left diagram of Figure 9 illustrates an example where there is a bounded
endorsement-only privilege and a bounded declassification-only privilege with
diﬀerent bounds. It may be possible for a value labeled Lfrom to be relabeled to
Lto via an endorsement to L0 followed by a declassification. Thus, labels between
Lfrom and L0 and between L0 and Lto are eﬀectively collapsed, since the bounded
privileges allow a value with any of these labels to be relabeled to any other of
these labels. More generally, as more overlapping bounded privileges exist for a
given principal, data can be downgraded in more possible ways.
6 Case studies
6.1 Calendar Case Study
We have extended LIO [22] with support for bounded privileges and robust priv-
ileges, and used them to develop a Calendar application to explore and illustrate
the utility of restricted privileges. The application allows users to view their ap-
pointments, and schedule appointments with each other. DC-label principals are
the calendar users. A user’s appointments are confidential to that user.
We consider a setting where principals belong to groups and a principal is
willing to disclose her availability to all and only members of her groups. For
example, if Bob wants to schedule an appointment with Alice at time t, the
application will check Alice’s calendar and inform Bob whether Alice is available
at that time. This operation, which declassifies Alice’s availability at time t to
Bob, should succeed only if Alice and Bob are in the same group.
Each user A has a robust declassification privilege rbstd{AQ}, and, for each
group G that A belongs to, a bounded endorsement privilege e[AQ]h>
c,Gi
h?c,?ii , where
G is the disjunction of all users in the group. These are the only privileges
available in the system for user A, and thus all endorsements must be bounded
appropriately, and all declassifications must be robust.
Joint scheduling between A and B works as follows:
1. User B sends a scheduling request for time t labeled hB,Bi to user A.
2. User A computes her availability for time t. Because the context that com-
putes the availability reads data labeled hA,Ai and hB,Ai, the label of the
availability result is hA ^ B,A _ Bi.
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3. If A and B are both in some group G, then A uses her bounded privilege
to endorse the availability result to hA ^ B,Ai, since she is prepared to take
sole responsibility for the availability result. Since both A and B are in the
same group, the endorsement satisfies the bounds (i.e., A_B vi G). If there
is no group for which both A and B are members, then A has no bounded
endorsement privilege for which the bounds will be satisfied.
4. User A uses her robust privilege to declassify the availability result to hB,Ai.
The declassification is robust.
5. User A sends the declassified value to B.
Because all downgrading in the system relevant to user A must use A’s
restricted privileges, we obtain strong system-wide guarantees, even if A’s re-
stricted privileges manage to escape from the scheduling component, and even if
if B sends malicious scheduling requests. Section 5 (Figure 11) discusses in more
detail the system-wide guarantees that hold when both a bounded endorsement
privilege and a robust declassification privilege are available.
6.2 Restricted Privileges in Existing Applications
Using our restricted privileges, we found a security vulnerability in an applica-
tion written using Haskell Automatic Information Labeling System (Hails) [9].
Hails is a web framework built on LIO that extends the traditional Model-View-
Controller paradigm to Model-Policy-View-Controller. The policy module speci-
fies all models and describes the labels for data fetched from the database. When
data is stored in the database, Hails checks labels against the policy module to
ensure appropriate data integrity. The policy module has access to a privilege
that can declassify all models. As a design pattern, policy modules export func-
tions that perform declassification for untrusted applications using the privilege;
untrusted applications never have direct access to the privilege.
Rock-Paper-Scissors3 is a Hails application that contains a security vulner-
ability due to misuse of the policy privilege, despite being written by security
experts who developed Hails.
The policy module includes a function to get the outcome of a match given a
particular move by a player. This function can be exploited to reveal the oppo-
nent’s move before the player has actually committed to a move by submitting
it to the database. As a result, a player can always win a match by exploiting
this function to determine which move will win, and then committing to that
winning move. When we replaced the policy module’s raw privilege with a robust
privilege, the robust declassification check signalled a potential security vulner-
ability. To fix the vulnerability, we added code that checks whether a player had
committed to a move (i.e., the move is in the database), and, if so, endorses the
submitted move. This endorsement allows the robust declassification check to
succeed. Endorsing only when the player has committed to his move fixes the
security vulnerability.
3 https://github.com/scslab/hails/tree/master/examples/hails-rock
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7 Related Work
Declassification can be characterized into diﬀerent dimensions: who, what, where,
and when [20]. Our work can be considering as restricting where in the secu-
rity lattice downgrading may occur (bounded downgrading) and who may in-
fluence downgrading (robustness). Almeida Matos and Boudol [1] introduce a
construct flow p   q in c to indicate where additional information flows are
allowed within a lexical scope. Intransitive noninterference [11, 12, 18] posits a
non-transitive information flow ordering which describes what downgrading op-
erations are permitted. Mantel and Sands [11] combine intransitive noninterfer-
ence with language techniques that use declassification annotations to explicitly
identify non-transitive information flows. In our bounded declassification mech-
anism, violating the normal ordering of security levels is tied to a runtime value,
and not lexically scoped or marked by annotations.
In Jif [13], declassifications may explicitly state where in the security lattice
the declassification occurs. By contrast, our bounded mechanisms declare this
restriction on the run-time value that authorizes downgrading. Jif uses a form of
access control to restrict which code may downgrade information, coined selective
declassification by Pottier and Conchon [17]. Specifically, a downgrading opera-
tion that may compromise the security of principal p may only occur in code that
has been (statically or dynamically) authorized by p. Similarly, the authority to
declassify or endorse information in Asbestos [7], HiStar [26], Flume [10], and
COWL [23] must come from the creator of the exercised privileges. By contrast,
LIO associates the authority to declassify or endorse a principal’s information
with a run-time value. This capability-like approach to authorizing downgrad-
ing enables our local declarative approach to restrict downgrading. Birgisson et
al. [4] use capabilities to restrict the ability to read and write memory locations,
but do not consider the use of capabilities to restrict downgrading.
Zdancewic and Myers [25] introduce the semantic security condition of ro-
bust declassification, and Myers et al. [16] enforce robust declassification with a
security type system [19, 24], and introduce qualified robustness, which extends
the concept to reason about endorsement. Askarov and Myers [2] subsequently
present a semantic framework for downgrading, and present a crisper version of
qualified robustness. Chong and Myers [6] extend the notion of robust declassi-
fication to the Decentralized Label Model [14, 15]. The run-time checks used in
this work to enforce robustness are analogous to the run-time checks Chong and
Myers introduce for the DLM. In other work, Chong and Myers [5] note that
the semantic security condition for robust declassification applies to information
flow of confidential information generally, including, for example, information
erasure, and is more general than just declassification. If the only privilege for p
available in the system is a robust privilege with mode mode d then the system
will be robust for p. If the privilege for that mode is de (i.e., robust declassi-
fication operations and robust endorsement operations are possible), then the
end-to-end security guarantee is qualified robustness [2, 16]. A system satisfies
qualified robustness if the only way an attacker can influence what information
is released to it is via robust endorsement operations.
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Foley et al. incorporate bounds constraints on a system with relabeling opera-
tions on objects [8]. Our model performs relabeling based on the use of capability-
like tokens rather than with respect to a particular subject. Bound restrictions
can be placed per privilege rather than on all relabeling operations, so the guar-
antees of this work are more dependent on what sorts of privileges are available
for use, but do not require changes to the trusted computing base.
The system HiStar [26] provides the notion of gates: entities designed to
encapsulate privileges so that processes can safely switch their current label
by exercising them through the gate. Gates have a clearance component which
imposes an upper bound on the label that results from using it. Gates can be
leveraged to restrict the use of privileges similar to upper bounds in bounded
privileges. Similar to our approach, Flume [10] distinguishes privileges used for
declassification (symbol  ) and endorsement (symbol +).
8 Conclusion
Restricted privileges are a new mechanism to control declassification and en-
dorsement in DC-labels that is simple and intuitive yet expresses a rich set of
desirable policies. Bounded privileges impose upper and lower bounds on data
that is declassified or endorsed. Robust privileges help prevent the accidental or
malicious exercise of privileges to downgrade more information than intended,
and can provide the end-to-end security guarantees of robustness and qualified
robustness. We provide sound and complete eﬃcient security checks for down-
grading using restricted privileges. We note that robust downgrading operations
can be viewed as privileged downgrading with a weakened privilege. We explore
the guarantees provided by combining the use of bounded and robust privileges
as well as their composition in a case study. This work establishes a basis for
better design of IFC systems that use privileges for downgrading information.
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